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Defendant/Appellee, Thomas E. Reese, by and through his counsel of record,
hereby submits the following Brief.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff, Sheila Reese, from an Amended Decree of
Divorce entered by the Third District Court, Salt Lake County (the "District Court"), the
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley presiding.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Amended Decree of Divorce pursuant
to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Court of Appeals and Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
The provisions of the Utah Code, Sections 78-45-1 through 78-45-13 (Utah
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act) are attached hereto as Appellee's Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action filed by Appellant Sheila Reese against Appellant
Thomas E. Reese on March 13, 1995. (R. 001-008). Defendant Thomas Reese filed his
answer on April 13, 1995. (R. 013-017).
The matter came on for trial before the District Court on June 4 through
June 5, 1996. On July 9, 1996, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. (R. 129-138) and thereafter entered a Decree of Divorce on August 14,
1996. (R. 139-144). Based upon Defendant's motion, the District Court entered an Amended
Decree of Divorce on October 16, 1996. The Plaintiff now appeals from the entry of the
1

Amended Decree of Divorce. The Amended Decree of Divorce addresses child support,
alimony, and the distribution of property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on January 14, 1985. (R. 129). The parties were
separated on March 29, 1992. (R. 207). The parties have one child, Cherina, bom as issue
of this marriage on September 14, 1986. (R. 130). Custody of Cherina was awarded to
Plaintiff pursuant to the stipulation of the parties entered on the record at the time of trial.
QcL).

Plaintiff is employed part-time in two jobs by Granite School District. In one
job, she is paid $8 per hour and in the other, she is paid $11 per hour (R. 130, 193). The
District Court that her total income from Granite School District is $586 per month. Plaintiff
voluntarily chooses to work part-time to remain at home with her daughter who was almost
10 years old at the time of trial. (R. 130).
Based upon Plaintiffs experience and her voluntary underemployment, the
District Court imputed income to her at the lower rate of $8 per hour, for an imputed monthly
income of $1,280 (assuming 160 paid hours per month). (R. 130). Plaintiff also enjoys net
rental income of $776 per month, for a total gross monthly income and imputed income of
$2,056, excluding child support. (R. 130-131). Plaintiff testified that since the parties were
separated (March 1992) and the trial, she has been able to meet her expenses and even save
money. (R. 223-225). Plaintiff also testified that her itemized monthly expenses of $1,436
were accurate (R. 232), with the exception of her personal health insurance (R. 220) and
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lessons for the parties' child, for which Defendant had been paying one-half. (R. 239). The
District Court found that Plaintiffs reasonable monthly expenses are $1,436 per month and
that Plaintiffs income and imputed income, together with child support, would be more than
enough to meet her expenses and maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the parties'
marriage. (R. 131).
Defendant is employed as a school teacher with a gross monthly income of
$3,409, plus net rental income at the time of trial of $183 per month, for a total of $3,592 per
month. (R. 131). Defendant's reasonable monthly expenses at the time of trial were in the
amount of $2,209, exclusive of expenses incurred as a result of attorney's fees and settlement
of a previous civil lawsuit and of child support obligations. (R. 131). The District Court also
ordered Defendant to maintain a life insurance policy in the amount of $100,000 until the
parties' child reaches 18 years of age. (R. 171). After trial but before entry of the Amended
Decree of Divorce, Defendant also became obligated to pay child support for another child
from a previous marriage in the amount of $346 per month. (R. 150-158). The District
Court denied Defendant's motion to amend the divorce decree to reflect this change in
Defendant's current obligations.
The District Court did not award alimony to either party and ordered Defendant
to pay child support, based upon the Plaintiffs income and imputed income and Defendant's
income discussed above, as required by Utah law. (R. 131).
Shortly after the parties' marriage, Plaintiff acquired through an advance on an
inheritance certain real property located on Herbert Avenue in Salt Lake City (the "Herbert
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Avenue" property), with a value of $70,000 at that time and a current market value of
$148,000. (R. 133). During the course of the parties' marriage, Defendant made substantial
contributions to the Herbert Avenue property, thereby maintaining and enhancing its value.
(R. 133). These contributions included installing a badly-needed new roof (R. 203-204),
paying to paint and remodel a portion of the interior (R. 208), building planter boxes, doing
yardwork, and making miscellaneous repairs. (R. 208-209).
As consideration for the work Defendant did on the Herbert Avenue property,
the parties entered an agreement in 1988 whereby Plaintiff granted Defendant a twenty-five
percent (25%) interest in the Herbert Avenue property. (R. 133). Plaintiff also executed and
delivered a Quit Claim Deed in favor of Defendant, granting Defendant a twenty-five percent
(25%) interest in the Herbert Avenue property. (R. 229). The District Court found that this
agreement was valid, supported by consideration, and was not the result of coercion or duress
and therefore awarded Defendant a 25% interest in the Herbert Avenue property. (R. 133).
In addition to Defendant's deeded 25% interest in Herbert Avenue, the District
Court found that Defendant had made additional contributions for specific improvements
which entitled Defendant to an additional equitable interest of $3,570. (R. 133). The value
of Defendant's 25% interest in the Herbert Avenue property, plus the $3,570, less Plaintiff's
one-half interest in Defendant's retirement account, resulted in a lien in Defendant's favor in
the amount of $26,224. (R. 134).
Between January 11, 1990 and March 13, 1992, Defendant also paid Plaintiff a
total of $4,850 which Defendant contended was to purchase an additional interest in the
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Herbert Avenue property. Although the District Court rejected Defendant's position on these
payments (R. 133-134 and Def. Ex. 8-6), Plaintiff acknowledged receiving and using the
money during the course of the parties' marriage. (R. 233-234).
Prior to the marriage, Plaintiff had an interest in certain real property located
on Scott Circle in Salt Lake City (the "Scott Circle" property). At the time of the marriage,
the Scott Circle property had a value of about $62,000 and a current market value at the time
of trial of $118,000. (R. 134). During the course of the parties' marriage, the Scott Circle
property was rented continuously. (R. 211). While the parties were married, the rental
income from Scott Circle was used to pay off the mortgage and to repay a loan used to have
the property remodeled. (R. 210-212). Although Defendant did perform some maintenance
on the Scott Circle property, his contributions were not sufficient to create an equitable
interest in the property and title was always in the Plaintiffs name. For those reasons, the
District Court awarded the Scott Circle property to Plaintiff. (R. 135).
Approximately one year after the parties' separation, Defendant purchased a
fifty percent (50%) interest in a duplex located on Belaire Drive in Salt Lake City. The
source of Defendant's down payment was an inheritance and Plaintiff has made no
contributions to this property. The Belaire property was (and is) subject to a significant
mortgage in the amount of $126,087 at the time of trial. (Def. Ex. 7). Therefore, the District
Court awarded the Belaire property to Defendant. (R. 135).
With respect to real property, therefore, Defendant ended up with a $26,224
interest in the Herbert Avenue and Belaire Drive property, subject to a significant mortgage.
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On the other hand, Plaintiff was awarded Scott Circle with a current market value of
$118,000 and Herbert Avenue, with a current market value of $148,000, less Defendant's lien
in the amount of $26,224. The value of Plaintiffs appreciable real estate interests are nearly
$240,000.
Defendant's total debts and obligations exceeded $167,000 at the time of trial.
(Def. Ex. 7). On the other hand, Plaintiffs financial statement (Def. Ex. 2) and trial
testimony indicate that she had no long-term debts at the time of trial beyond her normal
living expenses. (R. 220-226).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income to

Plaintiff using the lower of Plaintiffs current rate of pay of $8 per hour, based upon her clear
testimony that she is voluntarily underemployed. The District Court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to impute minimum wage to the Plaintiff because Plaintiff is currently
earning $8 per hour part of the time and $11 per hour part of the time. The District Court,
based upon Plaintiff's age, work history during the entire course of the parties' marriage, and
current salary, was justified in imputing full-time income to Plaintiff at the rate of $8 per
hour to arrive at a gross monthly salary of $1,280. The District Court properly used the
imputed amount of $1,280 and the net rental income amount of $776 to arrive at a gross
monthly income for purposes of calculating child support in the amount of $2,056. There is
no error.
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2.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding alimony

to Plaintiff. The parties were married and living together for seven years. Plaintiff's rental
and imputed monthly income of $2,056, with the addition of child support in the amount of
$372 per month ($2,428), as offset by Plaintiffs claimed living expenses of $1,436, leaves
Plaintiff with a net monthly income and imputed income of $992. This income is in addition
to significant appreciable assets (with a current market value of approximately $240,000),
including the Scott Circle property, owned by Plaintiff without encumbrance, and the Herbert
Avenue property, owned by Plaintiff with a lien in favor of Defendant in the amount of
$26,224. On the other hand, Defendant does not have a net monthly "windfall" as Plaintiff
argues. To the contrary, when all of Defendant's debts and obligations are considered,
Defendant has no discretionary income.
3.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in using Plaintiff's

imputed income in calculating Defendant's child support obligations.
4.

The District Court did not err in recognizing the post-marital agreement

of the parties, together with a quit claim deed, granting Defendant a one-quarter interest in
the Herbert Avenue property. The agreement and quit claim deed are supported by adequate
consideration and represent enforceable contracts.
5.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in honoring an agreement

and quit claim deed duly executed and delivered by Plaintiff granting Defendant a one-quarter
interest in the Herbert Avenue property. The appreciation of the value of the Herbert Avenue
property was enhanced and maintained by Defendant's efforts and Plaintiff understood or
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should have known that by granting Defendant a fixed percentage in the property, the value
of Defendant's interest would fall or increase as the property value fell or increased over time.
6.

The District Court did not err in failing to award Plaintiff attorney's

fees. If anything, the District Court erred in failing to award Defendant his attorneys fees as
expressly provided in the parties' 1988 agreement, which the District Court upheld and
enforced against Plaintiff. Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal.
ARGUMENT
L

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO CARRY HER BURDEN OF
DEMONSTRATING A CLEAR AND PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF
DISCRETION,
On appeal, the Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the District Court

abused its discretion with respect to the property distribution. In Bingham v. Bingham, 872
P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994), this Court explained the proper standard of review in
divorce actions:
Trial courts have "considerable discretion in determining the
financial interests of divorced parties." Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d
1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993). See also Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d
1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, property and alimony
awards "will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806
P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah
1991).
Thus, on appeal, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the District
Court not only abused its discretion, but that such abuse of discretion was "clear" and
"prejudicial." The District Court had "considerable discretion" in determining property
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allocation and alimony issues. Id As explained below, Plaintiff has failed to carry her
burden of persuasion on appeal as to every issue raised in her opening brief.
EL

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY IMPUTED FULL-TIME INCOME
TO PLAINTIFF AT HER CURRENT SALARY.
Plaintiffs first argument on appeal is that the District Court improperly imputed

full-time income to her at the lower of her two current hourly rates for part-time work.
Plaintiff objects first to the imputation of any income and, second, argues that if imputation of
income is proper, the District Court should have used the minimum wage. These arguments
are without merit.
First, imputation of income was proper. In order to support the imputation of
income, the trial court's findings must address "the critical question of whether the drop in
earnings was voluntary/' Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah App. 1993). Here the
District Court found, and Plaintiff clearly acknowledged at trial, that her underemployment
was voluntary. (R. 130, 195).
Second, Plaintiff argues that the lack of evidence in the record regarding
employment opportunities generally in the community and Plaintiffs employment history
show that the District Court abused its discretion in using the lower of Plaintiff's hourly
wages to impute income. These arguments are without merit.
Section 78-45-7.5(7), Utah Code Ann., provides that the District Court may
impute income upon a finding of voluntary underemployment "based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community." § 78-45-7.5(7)(b).
9

There is no better indication of Plaintiffs "employment potential and probably
earnings" than her current part-time salary. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in
using the hourly rate of $8 per hour as the basis of Plaintiff's full-time earning capacity.
Plaintiff clearly testified that she is currently paid two rates, $8 and $11 per hour for her parttime work as a secretary. Plaintiff stated:
Q.

What are you paid for your employment?

A.

I have two different jobs there. One I get $11.00; the

other one is $8.00.
(R. 193).
The record is not clear as to why Plaintiff has two different rates of pay or as
to the number of hours on average she receives the higher hourly rate. The District Court
elected to use Plaintiffs lower hourly rate of $8 per hour in calculating imputed income.
By the terms of the Code, the federal minimum wage should be used only if
there is no recent work history. § 78-45-7.5(7)(c). While subsection (c) requires that the trial
court enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for imputing a wage higher
than the federal minimum wage, subsection (c) by its terms applies only "if there is no recent
work history." Subsection (c) therefore not only does not apply to this action in light of
Plaintiffs extensive work history and present employment. But even more important, the
District Court made the required finding of fact justifying the imputation of income at $8 per
hour, namely, Plaintiffs current income of $8 and $11 per hour. Plaintiff is not earning
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minimum wage. Plaintiffs current salary is a reasonable basis upon which the District Court
based its imputation of full-time income at $8 per hour.
Because Plaintiff has current employment, the statute does not require that
Defendant hire a vocational expert and present evidence at trial as to job opportunities within
the community and average salaries in the area. See Hill v. Hill, 867 P.2d 963 (Utah App.
1994) (affirming the imputation of income based upon an implied finding of voluntary
underemployment). In the event the Plaintiff were not employed at all and had no job skills,
it may be necessary to present more extensive evidence as to her earning capacity. However,
the District Court clearly did not abuse its discretion in imputing full-time income at the
lower of Plaintiffs current rates of pay. This case was not decided in a vacuum. It is
common knowledge in this community that unemployment is at the lowest rate in years and
that even the entry-level, unskilled jobs in this market are paying much more than the current
minimum wage. If anything, the District Court's use of the $8 per hour figure was very
conservative and if error was committed, it was committed in Plaintiffs favor. Perhaps the
District Court should have used an average of Plaintiffs admitted $8 and $11 hourly rates.
But the District Court did not average the two rates and it was certainly not a clear abuse of
discretion to use the $8 rate.
Without any foundation in the record, Plaintiff also argues that she falls within
two exceptions to the imputation of income: (1) the costs of child care approach or exceed
the amount of income the Plaintiff could make by curing her underemployment and (2) the
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parties' child has "unusual emotional needs" which require the custodial parent's presence in
the home, as provided in Section 78-45-7.5(7)(d).
Plaintiffs arguments under subsection (d) fail for two reasons. First, subsection
(d) represents two exceptions to the imputation of full-time income rule for specific situations.
It is well established rule of statutory construction that the party attempting to fall within the
exception of a rule of law bears the burden of proof. E.g.. United States v. First City
National Bank. 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967) ("where one claims the benefits of an exception to
the prohibition of a statute," the person claiming that benefit bears the burden of proof);
United States v. Green, 962 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1992); Ekotek Site PRP Committee v.
Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Utah 1995).
There is absolutely no evidence of record which would support a finding that
the costs of day care would exceed the amount Plaintiff could earn if she cured her
underemployment. Plaintiffs argument on page 15 of her brief, claiming that day care
expenses, together with taxes and expenses, approached the amount of money she could earn
if she cured her voluntary underemployment, is not supported by the record. The only
evidence on the issue of day care is Plaintiffs comment that if she were employed full time,
she would have to have day-care or after-school care for the parties' daughter. (R. 195).
There is no evidence as to the true necessity for or the cost of such care. On the other hand,
the District Court was aware that the parties' daughter was nearly ten years old at the time of
trial and could infer that she did not need costly after-school care in the event of Plaintiffs
full-time employment. Plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proof that the day care costs
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approached the additional amount she could earn full time. It was not a clear, prejudicial
abuse of discretion for the District Court to impute full-time income to Plaintiff based on this
record.
In a desperate attempt to fall within the second exception of subsection (d),
Plaintiff also makes the unfounded, unsupported, and inflammatory argument that the parties'
daughter "is also emotionally vulnerable, because of the prior conduct of her father."1
Appellant's Brief at 16. This argument is not only wholly unsupported, but is improper on
appeal. There is no evidence of record concerning the parties' daughter's emotional condition.
The fact that Defendant stipulated to supervised visitation does not lead to the conclusion that
the parties' daughter is "emotionally vulnerable." The parties' child is not emotionally
vulnerable. She is an excellent student and is involved in many extra-curricular activities,
such as soccer and piano. The inference that Defendant harmed the parties' child in any way
is not only false (the case did not involve the parties' daughter), but inflammatory and
sensational.
Continuing, in an unconscionable attempt to defame Defendant by innuendo,
Plaintiffs brief incorrectly states that "Defendant had civil judgments in settlement of sexual
misconduct cases." Appellant's Brief at 16 (emphasis added). For support, Plaintiff cites the
District Court's Finding of Fact number 6, where the District Court stated: "Defendant's
reasonable monthly expenses incurred as a result of attorney's fees and settlement of a sexual

1

Plaintiff failed to cite to this Court wherein the record this argument was preserved for appeal.
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misconduct civil lawsuit."2 Plaintiff has intentionally mischaracterized Defendant's settlement
of a single civil case as though Defendant had multiple civil "judgments" entered against him
in several "cases," thus suggesting not only that there was more than one case, but that
Defendant was guilty. Mere settlement of a civil case does not mean Defendant
acknowledged liability. Plaintiffs argument also incorrectly suggests that the civil lawsuit
involved the parties' daughter. This is also incorrect. The case had nothing to do with the
parties' daughter, who would have no reason to even know about the civil action.
But even if the parties' daughter were "emotionally vulnerable" as argued by
Plaintiff for the first time on appeal, emotional vulnerability is not the standard under the
code. Rather, the statute requires "unusual emotional . . . needs" which "require the custodial
parent's presence in the home." Not only is there no evidence that the parties' daughter has
any unusual emotional needs, the record is silent as to why any such unusual emotional needs
make it necessary for the Plaintiff to be present in the home. Plaintiffs argument on this
point is wholly without merit.
Finally, Plaintiffs argument that Defendant, as a full-time school teacher, is
voluntarily underemployed, is also lacking in merit. Defendant works more than full time
during almost ten, not nine months of the year as a school teacher. He is paid monthly.
During the two months (mid June through mid August) that Defendant is not working as a
school teacher, he maintains his rental property. During the parties' marriage, Defendant
2

The Court should note that there is no evidence of record concerning the nature of the civil
lawsuit against Defendant, the parties involved, or the facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim.
The District Court's statement that Defendant settled a "sexual misconduct civil lawsuit" is totally
unsupported by the record. Therefore, no inference can be permissibly drawn therefrom.
14

maintained both the Herbert Avenue and Scott Circle properties. There is no authority that
suggests that the position a full-time school teacher constitutes voluntarily underemployment
for not having a paying job during the "summer." In order to impute additional income to the
Defendant, it would be necessary for the District Court to make the express finding that he is
voluntarily underemployed. The District Court made no such finding and based on the
record, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the District Court committed a clear, prejudicial
abuse of discretion on this issue.
In conclusion, Plaintiff has a current job, worked during the entire time the
parties were married, is making no less than $8 per hour, and is voluntarily underemployed.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion in connection with the District
Court's decision to impute full-time income to her at the hourly rate of $8. Moreover,
Plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proof on the two exceptions for imputation of income
for situations where the cost of child care make full-time employment unreasonable and
where unusual emotional needs of the child require the presence of the custodial parent in the
home. The District Court properly imputed income to the Plaintiff at the full-time rate of $8
per hour.
HI.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CALCULATED DEFEND ANTS
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS.
In a related argument, Plaintiff contends on appeal that because the District

Court improperly imputed full-time income to her at $8 per hour, the District Court therefore
improperly calculated Defendant's child support obligations. Plaintiffs argument is without
merit.
15

As discussed above, the District Court correctly imputed full-time income to
Plaintiff for purposes of calculating Defendant's child support obligations. Contrary to
Plaintiffs argument, the District Court also did not commit an abuse of discretion in refusing
to find that Defendant was voluntarily underemployed, thereby justifying an increase in his
income.
Plaintiff argues that the District Court should have awarded Plaintiff one-half
of child care expenses as provided in Section 78-45-7.16(1), Utah Code Ann. This argument
is without merit. Plaintiff has failed to cite to the record to establish that this issue was
preserved in the District Court as required by Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Moreover, Plaintiff failed to present evidence that she intended to obtain full-time
employment in order to pay all or a portion of child care expenses herself. Plaintiff also
failed to present any evidence as to the necessity and reasonable cost of such day care
expenses. The District Court committed no reversible abuse of discretion.
Finally, citing to the Record at 138 (the mailing certificate for the District
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law), Plaintiff argues without any foundation in
the record that Defendant did not pay adequate child support during the parties' separation and
therefore the District Court abused its discretion by failing to impose an order withholding
Defendant's child support obligations. This argument is also lacking in merit.
At page 132 of the Record, the District Court expressly refused to impose an
immediate withholding of child support "based on Defendant's timely payment of child
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support/' In the event Defendant were to fall behind, however, the District Court provided
for immediate mandatory income withholding relief.
Between March 1992 and the time of trial, Defendant paid $100 per month for
child support during the first year of the parties' separation and $150 per month during the
next three years of the parties' separation. (R. 325). Plaintiff has cited no evidence of record
suggesting that this amount of child support was inadequate or that it was not paid in a timely
manner. The District Court's finding that Defendant paid child support in a timely manner is
not clearly erroneous and is was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to decline to
impose mandatory withholding. Plaintiff has not established any harm from the District
Court's order on this issue. If Defendant falls behind, Plaintiff is entitled to immediate
withholding. There is no harm or error.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY NOT
AWARDING RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT.
Next, Plaintiff contends that the District Court abused its discretion by failing

to award her retroactive child support. More specifically, without any citation to or support
in the record, Plaintiff argues that retroactive child support is necessary to make up for
unqualified "child support shortages," alleged to have occurred during the parties' separation.
Appellant's Brief at 19. This argument is without merit and should be rejected.
Retroactive child support is not provided for by the Utah Code. This is not to
say that the District Court may not have equitable powers to impose retroactive child support
in certain cases, but the Legislature did not provide for retroactive child support in connection
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with divorce proceedings.3 However, Utah law provides an adequate remedy for custodial
parents to recover adequate child support after the separation of the parties but before the
entry of a divorce decree: a temporary order of support. Here, Plaintiff neither sought nor
obtained a temporary order of support. The District Court may have reasonably inferred that
Plaintiff sought no temporary order of support precisely because there were no child support
"shortages" as Plaintiff now argues. To the contrary, Defendant paid Plaintiff $100 per month
plus the telephone bill during the first year of their separation and $150 per month, less the
telephone bill, during the next three years of their separation. Plaintiff testified that she was
able to meet her expenses and save money during this time. (R. 223-225). Defendant's
consistent payments over the course of four years were adequate to satisfy Defendant's
obligation to support his child. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3, 78-45-4.2. There is no evidence
of record to support Plaintiffs argument that the payments she received during the four years
prior to trial were insufficient.
Nothing in Utah law required the District Court to impose retroactive child
support. Nothing in the record supports a finding that the Plaintiff suffered from child
support shortages during the time of the parties' separation. There is no basis from which
Plaintiff can reasonably that the District Court committed a clear, prejudicial abuse of

3

To be sure, Section 78-45a-3, Utah Code Ann., provides for a four-year statute of limitations
for a father's liability for past education and necessary support. However, this provision is part of the
Uniform Act on Paternity and has no application to the instant action and by no means constitutes a
mandate that retroactive child support was required here.
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discretion by ordering child support to commence as of the date of the trial. There is no
error.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO AWARD
PLAINTIFF ALIMONY.
Plaintiffs next argument on appeal is that the District Court abused its

discretion by failing to award her alimony. This argument is also without basis and must be
rejected.
Whether to award alimony in a divorce action is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the appellant
demonstrates that the trial court committed a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.
Bingham, 872 P.2d at 1067. No such abuse of discretion exists here.
This Court has explained that there are three factors the District Court must
consider in making an alimony award:
(1)
(2)
(3)

the financial condition and needs of the party seeking
alimony;
that party's ability to produce sufficient income for him
or herself; and
the ability of the other party to provide support.

Hill 869 P.2d at 966 (quoting Thronson v. Thronson, 810 R2d 428, 435 (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)). While the failure to consider these factors constitutes an
abuse of discretion, id, in this action, the District Court fully and adequately considered all
three factors and therefore did not abuse its discretion.
The record amply supports the District Court's decision not to award alimony
to either party. The parties were married for only seven years before they were separated in
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March 1992. Plaintiff's argument that the parties had a "lengthy" marriage of over 11 years
thus mischaracterizes the reality that they were separated over four years before the trial.
Plaintiff not only worked during the entire course of the parties' marriage and separation, but
by the time of trial had (1) paid off and remodeled one duplex on Scott Circle and will enjoy
rental income therefrom for the foreseeable future; and (2) owned all of the equity in the
home on Herbert Avenue, subject to Defendant's lien of just over $26,000. Plaintiffs
unencumbered interest in the Scott Circle and Herbert Avenue properties, both appreciable
assets, at the time of trial was nearly $240,000. Plaintiff also had a roommate at her Herbert
Avenue property who paid her $200 per month. Plaintiff is also voluntarily underemployed
such that any income disparity between the parties is not as significant as characterized by
Plaintiff on appeal. The District Court also awarded Plaintiff one-half ($14,346) of the entire
value of Defendant's retirement account with Granite School District, based on their de facto
marriage of seven years. Plaintiff also has no long-term debt.
Plaintiff testified at trial that since the parties were separated (March 1992) and
the trial, she has been able to meet her expenses and even save money. (R. 223-225).
Plaintiff also testified that her itemized monthly expenses of $1,436 were accurate (R. 232),
with the exception of her personal health insurance (R. 220) and lessons for the parties' child,
for which Defendant had been paying one-half. (R. 239). Plaintiff's argument on appeal that
her income, together with child support, is inadequate to meet her expenses is not supported
by her own testimony at trial.

20

Based on this evidence, the District Court found that Plaintiffs reasonable
monthly expenses of $1,436, with child support, "is more than adequate to meet her expenses
and maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage/' (R. 131). Plaintiffs
imputed income of $2,056, together with child support in the amount of $372 per month,
amounts to $2,428 in monthly income and imputed income. Using the District Court's finding
of reasonably monthly expenses of $1,436, Plaintiff would have almost $1,000 in income per
month to meet her tax obligations and as excess income. This is roughly the same amount of
"discretionary" income Plaintiff argues on appeal that Defendant enjoys and does not take into
account Plaintiff's ownership of significant real property assets.

Plaintiffs income, child

support, and real property assets are more than enough to make up for any health insurance
for herself, day care expenses, and piano and soccer lessons for her daughter (of which
Defendant was already paying one-half).
By comparison, Defendant's financial condition after the divorce is much less
stable than Plaintiff's. Where Plaintiff has appreciable real property assets valued at nearly
$240,000, Defendant has long-term debts and obligations in excess of $167,000, including
real property with a significant mortgage. While it is true that Defendant does have a
retirement account with a value of $28,692 (R. 132), Defendant has only twelve more years
of full time employment before he reaches retirement age.
Plaintiffs argument that Defendant has $1,011 per month in "discretionary"
income (Appellant's Brief at 28) is erroneous and is not supported by the record. Defendant's
monthly expenses as found by the District Court did not include his federal and state tax
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obligations. Based on Defendant's pay stub (Plfs. Ex. 4), Defendant had federal and state
withholdings, including F.I.C.A., in the amount of $884, leaving only $127 per month under
Plaintiffs argument. The District Court also did not include (for purposes of calculating
Defendant's child support obligations) amounts Defendant owes in connection with settlement
of the prior civil settlement. (R. 131). This amount is $150 per month.4 The amount of
Defendant's monthly obligations calculated by the District Court also does not include
payment for a life insurance policy as ordered by the District Court, an additional obligation
of at least $50 per month. Moreover, after the trial but before the entry of the final Amended
Decree of Divorce, Defendant became obligated to pay child support in the amount of $346,
for a minor child from Defendant's previous marriage. (R. 150-158). Because of his
precarious financial situation, Defendant has also been forced to take out additional loans to
pay attorneys' fees for this action and appeal and for living expenses. By no means does
Defendant have any "discretionary" or "extra" income as argued by Plaintiff, much less
discretionary income in excess of $1,000 per month. The District Court, considering
Defendant's age and ability to pay, did not abuse its discretion in declining to award Plaintiff
alimony.
With respect to health insurance, Plaintiff failed to prove she is uninsurable.
The District Court made no finding that Plaintiff is uninsurable. It is common knowledge
that if Plaintiff chose to work full time, she would be entitled to a health insurance benefit as

4

Comparing Defendant's Exhibit 6 (showing monthly expenses in the amount of $2,359), with
the District Court's finding of monthly expenses of $2,209, shows that the excluded amount is $150
per month.
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is Defendant. In fact, if she worked full time for Granite School District, her current
employer, she would be entitled to the exact same insurance plan the school district provides
to Defendant. Because Plaintiff is currently insured, she would be entitled to continued
coverage despite her claim to a pre-existing condition. Moreover, the District Court took into
consideration Plaintiffs arguments regarding insurance and at Plaintiffs request delayed entry
of the divorce decree for six months in order to allow Plaintiff to remain on Defendant's
health insurance as long as possible. By finding that Plaintiff is "capable of supporting . . .
herself/' the District Court also made the implicit finding that Plaintiffs income would be
sufficient to cover any additional health insurance needs Plaintiff may have in the future. The
District Court did not clearly abuse its discretion.
Plaintiff also argues that alimony was proper in light of the District Court's
award of $26,224 to Defendant, representing Defendant's interest in the Herbert Avenue
property, less Plaintiffs one-half interest in Defendant's retirement.5 This argument makes no
sense and is contrary to Utah law.
In Mortensen, the Utah Supreme Court explained that the fact that Plaintiff has
income-producing, inherited property, mitigates against an award of alimony:

5

The Court should note that in her opening brief, Plaintiff has misrepresented that Defendant
"was awarded the entirety of his retirement account through Granite School District. . . ." Appellant's
Brief at 29. This argument is false. In reality, the District Court awarded Plaintiff one-half ($14,396)
of the value of Defendant's retirement with Granite School District (R. 132). If Plaintiff is willing to
stipulate that the Court erred in awarding Plaintiff one-half of Defendant's entire retirement savings
(based on a de facto seven year marriage), Defendant would be willing to accept a credit in that
amount.
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The fact that one spouse has inherited or donated property,
particularly if it is income-producing, may properly be
considered as eliminating or reducing the need for alimony by
that spouse or as a source of income for the payment of child
support or alimony (where awarded) by that spouse.
760 P.2d at 308.
There is no dispute that the effect of the District Court's ruling leaves Plaintiff
owning the Scott Circle property, in fee simple, free and clear of any encumbrances and
owning the Herbert Avenue property, in fee simple, free and clear of any encumbrances other
than the lien in Defendant's favor in the amount of $26,224. The lien is nothing more than a
reflection of Defendant's recorded one-quarter ownership of the Herbert Avenue property, in
addition to a credit of approximately $3,000 for additional money Defendant expended on the
property. At trial, the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence as to the cost of financing a
loan to repay Defendant's valid lien or the cost of capital gains taxes in the event of a sale.
Plaintiffs attempt to raise the argument for the first time on appeal should be rejected.
Moreover, the District Court was fully aware that Plaintiff may need take out an equity loan
against her significant real property assets to pay Defendant's lien. The District Court made
an implicit finding that Plaintiff's rental and job income, together with child support, would be
sufficient to repay Plaintiffs debt to Defendant, just as the District Court made an implicit
finding that Defendant's income would be sufficient to pay child support.
In conclusion, the District Court committed no clear abuse of discretion in
declining to award Plaintiff alimony. The parties had only a de facto seven year marriage.
Plaintiff can support herself and is voluntarily underemployed. Plaintiff has significant real
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property assets, while Defendant has very little equity in the one home he currently owns.
Plaintiffs net income and imputed income exceeds Defendant's income as explained above.
And the District Court awarded Plaintiff one-half of the entire value of Defendant's retirement
account. If anything, the District Court erred in awarding Plaintiff one-half of Defendant's
retirement account, based on what was only a de facto seven-year marriage. Defendant has
seven children, besides Cherina, from two previous marriages. Plaintiff only has two other
children. There was no clear abuse of discretion.
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RECOGNIZED DEFEND ANTS
INTEREST IN THE HERBERT AVENUE PROPERTY.
Plaintiff argues that the District Court abused its discretion in recognizing

Defendant's one-quarter interest, plus a small additional equitable interest, in the Herbert
Avenue property. This argument is also without merit and should be rejected.
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the issue on appeal to be
whether the District Court properly "granted" Defendant an interest in the property and
properly calculated the amount of that interest. In reality, the District Court did not grant or
create an interest in Herbert Avenue (other than the equitable lien for $3,570). Defendant's
one-quarter interest in the Herbert Avenue property was granted by Plaintiff eight years
before trial as represented by a valid Quit Claim Deed, duly executed, acknowledged, and
delivered by Plaintiff in July 1988. (R. 229; Def. Ex. 1). Plaintiff testified that she
understood what it meant to grant Defendant a one-quarter interest in the Herbert Avenue
property. (R. 229). Granting Defendant a fixed percentage interest in the real property would
obviously mean that he would be entitled to any increase in the property's value, whether due
25

to market escalation or to improvements made to preserve or enhance the value of the
property. Defendant's one-quarter interest in Herbert Avenue was fixed in 1988. He is
obviously entitled to a proportionate share in any gains made in the property from that time.
The Quit Claim Deed itself, even in the absence of the parties' separate
Agreement, is prima facie evidence of Defendant's valid, enforceable interest in the Herbert
Avenue property. Under Utah law, a duly executed and acknowledged quit claim deed "shall
have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and to
the premises therein described, and all rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto
belonging, at the date of such conveyance." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13. Under Utah law,
"[a] presumption of valid delivery arises where the deed has been executed and recorded."
Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank 723 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 1986). "Plaintiff had
to overcome that presumption of delivery by clear and convincing evidence." Id Here,
Plaintiff presented no clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of valid
delivery. Instead, the District Court correctly found that the conveyance was supported by
consideration and was not obtained by coercion or duress. (R. 133).
Because Defendant's one-quarter interest in the Herbert Avenue property is
evidenced by a valid Quit Claim Deed, it was not necessary for the District Court to
determine whether the consideration for the Deed was exactly equal to the value of the onequarter interest in the property. To the contrary, the District Court simply recognized and
applied the well-established rule that the "[sufficiency of consideration is not necessarily
measured in terms of money value equivalents." Gorgoza. Inc. v. Utah State Road
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Commission, 553 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1976). In fact, under Utah law, a validly executed and
delivered deed need not be supported by any consideration at all: "As between the parties a
deed is good, with or without consideration." Barlow Society. 723 P.2d at 401. "Absent
fraud, duress, mistake, or the like attributable to the grantee, a competent grantor will not be
permitted to attack or impeach his own deed." Id
Here, Plaintiff has not only attempted to attack her own deed, but the
underlying consideration given for the deed. Plaintiff failed to carry her burden. She should
not be permitted to attack her own deed because she did not argue fraud, duress or mistake.
The District Court's finding that the Quit Claim Deed was supported by consideration and was
not obtained by coercion or duress is not clearly erroneous and therefore must be affirmed.
It is well established that the trial court is granted significant discretion in
determining the financial interests of the parties. Bingham, 872 P.2d at 1067. This rule has
particularly strong application to the trial court's disposition of gifted or inherited property. In
Mortensen, the Supreme Court noted:
Significantly, no case has been found where this Court has
reversed a trial court's disposition of gifts or inherited property
received by one party during the marriage. In almost every case,
we have emphasized the wide discretion trial courts have in
property division and have refrained from laying down any
general rules for the disposition of gifts and inherited property.
760 P.2d at 307. The Supreme Court then announced the general rule applicable in equitable
property distribution issues. The Court stated that Utah trial courts making an equitable
distribution of inherited property should:
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generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and
inheritance during the marriage . . . to that spouse, together with
any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) the
other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to
the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property,
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in i t . . . .
760 P.2d at 308.
In this action, the District Court properly followed this rule of law. The
District Court awarded the Scott Circle property to Plaintiff in fee simple, free and clear of
any encumbrances. The District Court also awarded Herbert Avenue to Plaintiff, subject to
Defendant's $26,000 lien. At the same time, the District Court properly recognized that
through Defendant's work, effort and expenses contributed to the enhancement and
maintenance of the Herbert Avenue property, there was adequate consideration to support
Plaintiffs previous conveyance of a twenty-five percent interest in the Herbert Avenue
property and Defendant's equitable interest in the property in the amount of $3,570. (R. 133).
Defendant's equitable interest is amply supported by the evidence (Def. Ex. D-8, at 8, 9, 10,
and 11) and is not clearly erroneous.
Citing to the Record at 338-339, Plaintiff argues that'there was a failure of
consideration because Defendant "failed to support the family, so as to allow plaintiff to save
all of her child support for her older children . . . ." (Appellant's Brief at 34). This argument
is a gross distortion of the parties' Agreement and of the facts.
The parties' Agreement recites the past consideration for Defendant's twentyfive percent interest in the Herbert Avenue property. The second paragraph 1 of the
Agreement provides in part as follows:
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Tom has not only kept his word regarding the above [relating to
improvements and maintenance], but because of his financial
assistance, I have been able to use my monies to pay insurance
and taxes on the above-mentioned house and property [Herbert],
payments and expenses on another house and property I solely
am buying [Scott Circle]; and I have been able to channel the
child support payments that I receive for my two daughters
towards their individual savings accounts and miscellaneous
expenses instead of using it for food and other usual living
expenses that occur in a family. Tom is continuing these efforts;
and also facilitating and sharing in the financing and repairs of
said property to ensure it is painted, and a new roof is put on as
soon as possible.
Plaintiff has misconstrued this provision of the Agreement to place a duty on Defendant not
only to support Plaintiff and their daughter, but also Plaintiffs two other daughters from a
previous marriage. The language of the Agreement does not support this construction. To
the contrary, the language merely states that because of Defendant's past support, Plaintiff has
been able to "channel the child support payments" into "individual savings accounts" of
Defendant's two step daughters. Moreover, the language of the Agreement places a duty on
Defendant to "continu[e] these efforts," not a duty to support two children who were not his.
But more important, the record does not even suggest that Defendant "failed to
support the family" as argued in Plaintiffs Brief (at 34). On the pages cited by Plaintiff for
support of this argument (R. 338-339), Plaintiff herself testified that she did not put her two
other daughters' child support into separate savings accounts, but "let them have it and they
governed their own money and they saved it, or they would buy clothes, or they would go to
a movie, but they were in charge of their child support. I let them have their money." (R.
338). The daughters elected not to save all of their money, but each ended up with $1,500 to
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$1,700 at the age of 18 when the support ended. (R. 339). Finally, Plaintiff testified that
Defendant did not pay $1,000 for one of his step daughter's braces, but that the money came
from her child support. It is this testimony upon which Plaintiff apparently relies to argue
that Defendant "failed to support the family." Plaintiffs argument that because Defendant did
not pay for a step daughter's braces, he "failed to support the family," is a gross
mischaracterization of the record and should not be accepted on appeal. Defendant had no
legal or moral duty to pay for his step daughter's braces. The step daughter's child support
from her faither was properly used for that expense. Defendant has eight other children for
which he has been and is responsible.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the parties' Agreement is void as against public
policy, citing Section 30-8-4(2), Utah Code Ann.6 This argument is likewise without merit.
The provision of the Agreement, paragraph 2, provides that in the event of the parties'
divorce, Plaintiff will accept Defendant's ownership of the Herbert Avenue property "or a
reasonable portion thereof." as settlement in full for child support and alimony, (emphasis
added). Because the language suggests that something less than Defendant's one-quarter
interest in the Herbert Avenue property may be sufficient in the event of the parties divorce,
the language is not binding but a recital of an agreement to agree as to settlement terms at
some point in the future. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the ownership of
inherited property, especially income producing, is a factor for the court to consider in

6

The Court should note that Plaintiff failed to cite to the record to establish that this argument
was preserved in the trial court
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"eliminating or reducing the need for alimony . . . or as a source of income for the payment
of child support . . . ." Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. The language of the Utah Code does
not declare such agreements as void and unenforceable. Rather, the code provides that the
duty to pay child support "may not be affected by a premarital agreement." Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-8-4(2). Plaintiffs agreement to accept Defendant's interest in the Herbert Avenue
property does not avoid Defendant's child support duty. Rather, it stipulates that Defendant's
reconveyance of his interest in Herbert Avenue is sufficient consideration to pay Defendant's
child support obligations. But in any event, this argument is moot because the District Court
did not attempt to enforce this provision of the Agreement. Rather, the District Court set
Defendant's child support obligations as provided in the Utah Code. Defendant's child
support obligations were, in accordance with the code, unaffected by the parties' Agreement.
There was no error. But even if the parties' Agreement were void, the separate, executed,
acknowledged and recorded Quit Claim Deed would not be affected. The deed by itself is a
valid, enforceable conveyance.
Plaintiff next argues in desperation that the parties' agreement is void because it
was a will and did not conform to the execution provisions of the probate code.7 Appellant's
Brief at 34. This argument is equally lacking in merit.
The parties' Agreement is not a will. No provision of the Agreement
purporting to transfer Defendant's interest to Plaintiff upon Defendant's death has been called

7

The Court should note that Plaintiff failed to cite to the record to show this Court that her
argument was preserved in the trial court.
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into question. Moreover, even if the Agreement were invalid for some reason, the Plaintiffs
conveyance was memorialized in a Quit Claim Deed, duly executed and acknowledged by the
Plaintiff in accordance with the provisions of the Utah Code dealing with deeds. Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-13. The deed need not as a matter of law comply with the execution provisions
of the probate code. The Deed itself was a binding, enforceable, recordable instrument
conveying present title to Defendant as a matter of law. Plaintiffs argument must be rejected.
VII.

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL.
The District Court ordered that each party bear his or her own costs and

attorney's fees in this action. Defendant is entitled to an award of his reasonable attorney's
fees and costs on appeal because Plaintiffs appeal is frivolous. It has long been the rule of
this Court that where an appellant in a domestic action must bear the expense of defending a
frivolous appeal, he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal. Burt v. Burt, 799
P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990); Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah App. 1990); Porco
v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988). Here, Plaintiff/Appellant has not raised a single
argument of substance or merit. Defendant should prevail on each issue appealed. Therefore,
Defendant is entitled to his reasonable attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
On the other hand, Plaintiff was not awarded attorney's fees below. In order to
be entitled to an award of fees on appeal, she must present a "well-supported claim of
changed circumstances." Burt, 799 P.2d at 1171. She has failed to meet her burden of
showing a significant change in circumstances and therefore is not entitled to an award of
attorney's fees on appeal.
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Under Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-3, the award of attorney's fees in a
divorce action is discretionary with the District Court. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156
(Utah App. 1989). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the District Court made a clear,
prejudicial abuse of discretion in declining to award attorney's fees to any party. The District
Court's finding that Plaintiff can take care of herself is not clearly erroneous. Plaintiff
currently owns real estate with a present market value in excess of $240,000 (after deducting
Defendant's $26,224 interest) and future rental income therefrom for the foreseeable future.
She is employed part-time and employable full-time. She can bear her own attorney's fees
and costs.
If anything, the District Court erred in not awarding attorney's fees to
Defendant. The parties' Agreement, which the District Court properly upheld and enforced,
the parties agreed that in any dispute regarding the Agreement, the breaching party would be
responsible to pay the non-breaching attorneys' fees and costs. Nevertheless, the District
Court declined to award Defendant his attorneys' fees and costs, finding simply that
Defendant had the ability to pay his own fees. The District Court certainly did not err in
declining to award Plaintiff her fees and costs, especially in light of Plaintiff's contractual
obligation to pay Defendant's fees.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Amended Decree of Divorce should be affirm*
every respect and Appellee should be awarded his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in defending this appeal.
DATED this 3/Vdav of June 1997.
PARRY LAWRENCE & WARD

BRENT D. WARD, Esq.
BRET F. RANDALL, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellee
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This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil liability for Support Act.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 1.
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parental duty to support child, 48 A.L.R.4th
919.
Child support: court's authority to reinstitute
parent's support obligation after terms of prior

78-45-2.

decree have been fulfilled, 43 A.L.R.4th 953.
Modern status of views as to validity of
premarital agreements contemplating divorce
or separation, 53 A.L.R.4th 22.
Enforceability of premarital agreements goveming support or property rights upon divorce
or separation as affected by circumstances surrounding execution — modern status, 53
A.L.R.4th 85.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection
78-45-7.6(1).
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Recovery Services.
(3) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered
and is calculated using the guidelines before additions for medical expenses and work-related child care costs.
(4) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support
table," "base child support obligation table," "low income table," or "table"
means the appropriate table in Section 78-45-7.14.
(5) "Child" means a son or daughter younger than 18 years of age and
a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living
and is without sufficient means.
(6) "Court" means the district court, juvenile court, or administrative
agency which may enter a child support order as defined in Section
62A-11-401.
(7) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or
otherwise, and specifically includes periodic payment pursuant to pension
or retirement programs, or insurance policies of any type. Earnings
specifically includes all gain derivedfromcapital,fromlabor, orfromboth
combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital
assets.
(8) "Guidelines" means the child support guidelines in Sections 78-457.2 through 78-45-7-21.
(9) "IV-D* means Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section
601 et seq.
(10) "Joint physical custody19 means the child stays with each parent
overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents contribute to
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support.
(11) "Medical expenses" means health and dental expenses and related
insurance costs.
(12) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed.
(13) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support.
(14) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services.
(15) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a
stepparent.
(16) "Split custody" means that each parent has physical custody of at
least one of the children.
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(17) "State* includes any state, territory, or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(18) "Stepchild" means any child having a stepparent.
(19) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to a child's
natural or adoptive custodial parent who is not the child's natural or
adoptive parent or a person living with the natural or adoptive parent as
a common law spouse, whose common law marriage was entered into in
this state under Section 30-1-4.5 or in any other state which recognizes the
validity of common law marriages.
(20) "Work-related child care costs" means reasonable child care costs
for up to a full-time work week or training schedule as necessitated by the
employment or training otthe custodial parent under Section 78-45-7.17.
(21) "Worksheets" means the forms used to aid in calculating the base
child support award.
section (4) inserted "base child support obligation table," "low income table," and "appropriate"; in Subsection (8), substituted "78-45-7.21"
for "78-45-7.18"; deleted former Subsection (15)
which defined "total child support award"; and
made stylistic changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
F e d e r a l Law. - Title IV-D of the federal
Social Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 651 et seq.
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.

History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 2; 1979, ch.
131, § 1; 1982, ch. 63, § 1; 1989, ch. 214,5 2;
1990, ch. 100, § 1; 1994, ch. 118, § 1; 1994,
ch. 140, § 13.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1994 amendment by ch. 140, effective May 2, 1994, added
the definition of "office" and redesignated the
other subsections accordingly.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 118, effective
July 1, 1994, added Subsections (2), (6), (9),
(11), and (20) and redesignated the remaining
subsections accordingly; in Subsection (3), inserted "that may be ordered and is" and deleted
"uninsured* before "medical expenses"; in Sub-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Joint physical custody.
Cited.
Joint physical custody.
Courtordered visitation that included a total
of over 120 overnight stays per year, plus additional visitation days, exceeded the threshold
for joint physical custody under Subsection (10)

and, thus, the court was required to follow the
mandate of the child support guidelines and
use the joint custody child support worksheet
or make findings of fact justifying its deviation.
Udy v. Udy, 893 R2d 1097 (Utah C t App. 1995).
Cited in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909
(Utah C t App. 1988); Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d
978 (Utah C t App. 1988); Ball v. Peterson, 912
R2d 1006 (Utah C t App. 1996).

78-45-3. Duty of man.
(1) Every father shall support his child; and every man shall support his
wife when she is in need.
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or
78-45-7.15:
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of
the parents.
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses
described in Subsection (2Xa) incurred on behalf of minor children.
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History: L. 1957, ch. 110, $ 3; 1977, ch.
140,§ 3; 1991, ch. 143, ft 1; 1995, ch. 175, ft 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, added Subsection
(2).

Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport
of children, ft 76-7-201.
Divorce, maintenance of parties, ft 30-3-5.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, ft 77-31-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
cumscribed by the more specific duly imposed
by the court. In re C J.U., 660 R2d 237 (Utah
1983).

ANALYSIS

Cause of action for support.
—Jurisdiction.
Child's right to support.
Duty to support children.
—Judicial limitation.
— Handicapped child.
—Transfer.
Duty to support wife.
—Termination.
Divorce.
Estoppel to assert duty to support.
Wrongful death action.
— Medical and burial expenses.
Cited.

—Handicapped child.
Trial court properly required husband to pay
child support after the child reached 21 years of
age where the child was retarded and incapable
of self-support. Garrand v. Garrand, 615 P.2d
422 (Utah 1980).
—Transfer.
A parent cannot rid himself of his duty to
support his children by purporting to transfer
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v.
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977).
Duty to s u p p o r t wife.

Cause of action for s u p p o r t
A minor child, via her guardian ad litem, has
standing to maintain a cause of action against
her father for support. Fauver v. Hansen, 803
R2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

— Termination.

—Jurisdiction.
In a proceeding on a petition by the guardian
and conservator for a child, appointed following
the death of the custodial parent, the trial
court's jurisdiction over the surviving parent
arose not from the original divorce decree, but
rather from the petition to enforce the support
obligation of the parent. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892
R2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Child's right to support
A child's right to support is his own right, not
his parent's. Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 R2d
895 (Utah 1976).
A surviving parent's obligation, of support
existed at the time of the custodial parent's
death, regardless of whether a guardian and
conservator had legal custody; thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in retroactively applying a support order back to the date
of the custodial parent's death. Jensen v.
Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah C t App. 1995).
Duty to support children.
—Judicial limitation.
Parents are permanently "duty-bound" to
support their children; however, the extent of
that duty is not without limitation, and where
the question of child support has been submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction and a
ruling thereon has been obtained, the more
general statutory duty of support becomes cir-

Divorce.
Divorce terminates husband's duty to support his wife except for any obligations imposed
by the divorce decree. Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d
127 (Utah 1977).
Estoppel t o a s s e r t d u t y t o support.
Children have a right to support, but where
their mother and her second husband had provided it, mother was estopped to demand that
her first husband also contribute support; since
her demand was not in the nature of a claim for
reimbursement, to grant it would have been in
effect to give the children 'double support" to
which they were not entitled. Wasescha v.
Wasescha, 548 R2d 895 (Utah 1976).
Wrongful death action.
—Medical and burial expenses.
District court erred in deducting proceeds of
medical and burial insurance policy from
amount of special damages in action by father
for wrongful death of son, since father was
under legal duty imposed by statute to pay cost
of medical care and burial expenses for son and
was thus entitled to recover amounts reasonably expended for that purpose; mere fact that
plaintiff at own expense carried insurance to
protect against such contingencies should not
inure to benefit of wrongdoer. Ottley v. Hill, 21
Utah 2d 896, 446 P.2d 301 (1968).
Cited in Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 258 (Utah
1987).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments —
Family Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 273.
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in
Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 859.
Am. Jur. 2d* — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and
Wife § 329 et seq.; 69 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and
Child § 54.
CJJ&. - 41 C J.S. Husband and Wife § 48;
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 55 to 58.
AJLR. — Death of putative father as precluding action for determination of paternity or

for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188.
Liability of parent for support of child institutionalized by juvenile court, 59 A.L.R.3d 636.
Sexual partner's tort liability to other partner for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding
sterility or use of birth control resulting in
pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 301.
Parent's child support liability as affected by
other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation regarding sterility or use of birth control, or
refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 AL.R.5th 337.
Key Numbers* — Husband and Wife «» 4;
Parent and Child «=» 3.1(2).

78-45-4. Duty of woman.
(1) Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support her husband
when he is in need.
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or
78-45-7.15:
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of
the parents.
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses
described in Subsection (2Xa) incurred on behalf of minor children.
History: L. 1957, ch, 110, § 4; 1995, ch*
175, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, added Subsection
(2).

Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport
of children, § 76-7-201.
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
660 P.2d 237 (Utah 1983).

ANALYSIS

Duty to support children.
—Judicial limitation.
—Transfer.
—Termination.
Divorce.
Cited.

—Transfer.
A parent cannot rid herself of her duty to
support her children by purporting to transfer
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v.
ChiUey, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977).
—Termination*

Duly to support children*
—Judicial limitation*
Parents are Muty-bound* to support their
children; however, the extent of that duty is not
without limitation, and where the question of
child support has been submitted to a court of
competent jurisdiction and a ruling thereon has
been obtained, the more general statutory duty
of support becomes circumscribed by the more
specific duty imposed by the court In re C.J.U.,

Divorce.
The fact that the wife in a divorce proceeding
is not required to pay support, neither terminates the children's right, nor obviates the
mother's responsibility, for such support as
may be determined at some future time. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985).
Cited in Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah
CtApp. 1993).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — From Guesswork to
Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child
Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev.
859.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and
Wife § 334; 69 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child
§ 54.
C.J.S. - 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 48;
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 54.
AJLR. — Liability of parent for support of
child institutionalized by juvenile court, 59
A.L.R.3d 636.
Wife's possession of independent means as

affecting her right to child support pendente
lite,60A.L.R.3d832.
Sexual partner's tort liability to other partner for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding
sterility or use of birth control resulting in
pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 801.
Parent*8 child support liability as affected by
other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation regarding sterility or use of birth control, or
refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 337.
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife «» 4;
Parent and Child «=* 3.1(3).

78-45-4.1. Duty of stepparent to support stepchild — Effect of termination of marriage or common law
relationship.
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that a natural or
adoptive parent is required to support a child. Provided, however, that upon
the termination of the marriage or common law relationship between the
stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive parent the support obligation
shall terminate.
History: C, 1953, 78-46-4.1, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 131, § 2; 1980, ch. 42, § 1.
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.

Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Equitable estoppel.
Cited.
Equitable estoppel*
Since courts are reluctant to use an equitable
estoppel theory to impose a support obligation
on a man who is not the biological father of a
child, a stepfather was not equitably estopped

from denying liability where there was no evidence that the mother had attempted to collect
support from the natural father, even though
the stepfather had married the mother prior to
the child's birth, and at one time had claimed
the child as his own. Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d
700 (Utah 1985).
Cited in Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006
(Utah CtApp. 1996).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — From Guesswork to Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 806 (1987).
Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child
AXJL — Stepparents postdivorce duty to
Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. support stepchild, 44 AXiL4th 520.
859.
Parental rights of man who is not biological
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, or adoptive father of child but was husband or
Wiese v. Vfiese: Support Obligations of Steppar- cohabitant of mother when child was conceived
ents — The Utah Supreme Court Toppled by or born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655.
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78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has primary obligation of support — Right of stepparent to recover
support.
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the natural parent or adoptive
parent of the primary obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has the
same right to recover support for a stepchild from the natural or adoptive
parent as any other obligee.
History: C. 1963, 78-45-4-2, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 131, S 3.
Cross-References* — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.

Income withholding, §§ 62A-11-401 to 62A11-414.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cause of action for support
A minor child, via her guardian ad litem, has
standing to maintain a cause of action against

her father for support. Fauver v. Hansen, 803
P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Steppar-

ents — The Utah Supreme Court Tbppled by
Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987).

78-45-4*3. Ward of state — Primary obligation to support.
Notwithstanding Section 78-45-2, a natural or an adoptive parent or
stepparent whose minor child has become a ward of the state is not relieved of
the primary obligation to support that child until he reaches the age of
majority.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 120, § 1.
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.

Period of minority, § 15-2-1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Ball v. Peterson, 912 R2d 1006
(Utah Ct App. 1996).

78-45-5. Duly of obligor regardless of presence or residence of obligee.
An obligor present or resident in this state has the duty of support as defined
in this act regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee.
History: L. 1957, oh. 110, { 5.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1.
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Am. JUT. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion and
Nonsupport §§ 32, 95.

Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife *=> 4;
Parent and Child «=» 3.1(5).

78-45-6. District court jurisdiction.
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under
this act.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, 5 6.
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction
of district court, § 78-3-4.

Meaning of "this act.* — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Applicability.
In a proceeding on a petition by the guardian
and conservator for a child, appointed following
the death of the custodial parent, the trial
court's jurisdiction over the surviving parent

arose not from the original divorce decree, but
rather from the petition to enforce the support
obligation of the parent. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892
R2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 147
et seq.
Key Numbers. — Courts «=> 156.

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior
court order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on
the part of the obligor or obligee.
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the
automatic adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support
shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a showing of a material
change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision:
(i) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child
support award required by the guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's
voluntary reduction of income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall
require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing
award may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
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(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of
others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this
chapter.
Juljrl, 1994, designated former Subsection (1)
as Subsection (lXa) and added Subsection
(1Kb).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References. — Creation of Department of Human Services, § 62A-1-102.
Creation of Judicial Council, Utah Const.,
Art. VIII, Sec. 12; § 78-3-21.
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5.
Public support of children, § 62A-11-301 et
seq.

History: L. 1957, ch. 110, 5 ?5 1977, ch.
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2; 1989, ch. 214,5 3;
1990, ch. 100, S 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 2; 1994,
ch. 140, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment by ch. 140, effective May 2,1994, substituted "the Uniform Child Support Guidelines
described in this chapter" for *but not limited
to: (a) the amount of public assistance received
by the obligee, if any; and (b) the funds that
have been reasonably and necessarily expended in support of spouse and children" at
the end of Subsection (4).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 118, effective

NOTES TO DECISIONS
— Joint physical custody.
Court-ordered visitation that included a total
of over 120 overnight stays per year, plus additional visitation days, exceeded the threshold
for joint physical custody under § 78-45-2(10)
and, thus, the court was required to follow the
mandate of the child support guidelines and
use the joint custody child support worksheet
or make findings of fact justifying its deviation.
Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

ANALYSIS

Amount of award.
Assessment of arrearages.
— Due process requirements.
— Joint physical custody.
Factors considered.
— Wealth of party's parents.
Findings of fact.
Modification of support.
—Application of guidelines.
— Change in circumstances.
—Divorce decree.
State recovery of assistance to child.
Cited.

Factors considered*

Amount of award.
Award to wife of $300 per month per child
was an abuse of discretion, in light of the
disparity between the wife's monthly gross income, $1,033, and the husband's, $8,333; award
was therefore increased to $600 per month per
child. Martinez v. Martinez, 764 P.2d 69 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), rev*d on other grounds, 818 R2d
538 (Utah 1991).
Assessment of arrearages.
— Due process requirements*
Due process of law requires that court must
consider the relevant factors set out in this
section in assessment of obligor for public assistance benefits received by the obligee prior to
a court order for support Roberts v. Roberts,
592 R2d 697 (Utah 1979).

—Wealth of party's parents.
The plaintiff argued the wealth of the defendants parents, who made large gifts of money
to the defendant during the marriage, should
have been considered by the trial court. Such a
consideration would have been tantamount to
imputing the wealth and income of her parents
to the defendant, and thereby imposing a duty
of child support on the grandparents. Such a
result would have been contrary to the concepts
of parental duty and common sense. Ebbert v.
Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah a . App. 1987),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
Findings of fact.
The trial court's failure to make explicit findings regarding the statutory factors pertinent
in a child support determination requires remand to the trial court. Stevens v. Stevens, 754
P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
This section requires the trial court to consider at least the seven factors listed therein.
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Further, those factors constitute material issues upon which the trial court must enter
findings of fact. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d
909 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Where the court orders a party to pay child
support to a child who has reached the age of
majority but is nevertheless entitled to support
under § 78-45-2, the court must enter specific
findings of fact on each of the factors set forth in
this section. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Case was remanded for proper child support
findings, where findings of the parties , incomes
were insufficient to support an award of child
support. Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
Trial court's findings were inadequate that
merely noted a "dramatic* increase in the father's income and a "substantial" decline in the
mother's health, and set the award at $200 per
month per child. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 R2d 713
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

decree, would have permitted an upward deviation from the guidelines in a modification proceeding. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 R2d 955 (Utah
a . App. 1994).
— Divorce decree*
The divorce decree establishes the duly of
support the ex-husband owes to his ex-wife and
a complaint under this section to modify that
duty of support is improper. Mecham v.
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977).
Plaintiff was required to file a petition to
modify her divorce decree under Rule 6-404 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration when
she sought to enforce, by order to show cause, a
provision in the decree that provided that future child support would be automatically adjusted to reflect changes in income. Such a
provision violates Subsection (1) of this section,
which provides that a child support order can
only be modified based upon a showing of a
material change in circumstances. Grover v.
Grover, 839 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Modification of support.
— Application of guidelines.
The trial court committed reversible error
when it failed to apply the presumptive guidelines set forth in this chapter and determined
child support outside the guidelines without
finding there were special circumstances that
justified deviation. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
— Change in circumstances.
Factors other than a change in relative income affecting the child support calculation can
constitute a material change in circumstances
allowing the court, on a modification petition,
to reach the issue of whether a deviation from
the guidelines is now appropriate. Significant
changes in the factual circumstances of the
child, such as special education or health needs,
which, if in existence at the time of the original

State recovery of assistance to child.
State, which was joined as a party to the
divorce action before court entered order determining husband's obligation for child support,
was entitled to reimbursement from the husband for assistance furnished the child before
entry of the order for support in the amount,
based upon the relevant factors as set out in
this section, as set out in the support order.
Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979).
Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d
696 (Utah C t App. 1989); Proctor v. Proctor,
773 R2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Moon v.
Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review* — Note, New Standards
AXJL — Loss of income due to incarceration
for Child Support Enforcement in Utah, 1986 as affecting child support obligation, 27
Utah L. Rev. 691.
AI*R.6th640.
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The AdopCJFJ3. - 41 C J . S . Husband and Wife § 48 et
tion of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in seq.; 67A CJJ3. Parent and Child § 50.
Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 859.
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife *=» 4;
Am. Jar. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and Parent and Child «=» 3.1(5).
Wife § 330 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and
Child § 54 et seq.
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78-45-7.1. Medical expenses of dependent children — Assigning responsibility for payment — Insurance
coverage — Income withholding.
The court shall include the following in its order:
(1) a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable
and necessary medical expenses for the dependent children;
(2) a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate
insurance for the medical expenses of dependent children, if coverage is or
becomes available at a reasonable cost;
(3) provisions for income withholding, in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(4) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Parts 4 and 5.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 13, § 3; 1990, ch. 166, § 3; 1993, ch.
261, § 12; 1994, ch. 118, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective January 1, 1994, rewrote the
undesignated introductory paragraph, which
read "When no prior court order exists or the
prior court order makes no specific provision for
the payment of medicrf and dental expenses for
dependent children, the court m its order ;

made several stylistic changes in Subsections
(1) and (2); and added Subsections (3) and (4)
The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994,
deleted a and dental" after "medical" in Subsection (1) and deleted "health, hospital, and dental care" after "appropriate" and inserted
"medical expenses" in Subsection (2).
Cross-References. - Divorce, maintenance
^ h e a l t h c a r e rf ^
§ 30.3.5

78-45-7.2* Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing
or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1,1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or
permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the
application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with
these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the
provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an
award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to
rebut the presumption in that case.
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of
that parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the
option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting
or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (5).
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(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the respective parents for the additional children. The obligations
shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before
Tletermining the award in the instant case.
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be applied
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied to justify a
decrease in the award.
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment of the guidelines and any
subsequent change in the guidelines constitutes a substantial or material
change of circumstances as a ground for modification or adjustment of a court
order, if there is a difference of at least 25% between the existing order and the
guidelines. In cases enforced under IV-D of Title IV of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., the office may request modification, in accordance with the requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law
100-485, no more often than once every three years.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, § 3; 1990,
ch. 275, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "and the
use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines" in Subsection (2Kb); in Subsection (6),
inserted "or adjustment" in the first sentence
and substituted I n cases enforced under IV-D
of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
Section 601 et seq." for "With regard to IV-D

cases" at the beginning of the second sentence;
and made stylistic changes.
Federal Law. — The Family Support Act of
1988, Public Law 100-485, cited in Subsection
(6), amended various sections throughout Title
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et
seq.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1989, ch. 214
became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Modification of award.
— Change in circumstances.
Other children.
Modification of award.
When the parties had agreed to the amount
of child support before the effective date of the
child support guidelines, the trial court erred in
modifying child support when no petition to
modify had been filed and in modifying the
support amount without finding that a material
change of circumstances had occurred since the
previous order had been entered. Bailey v.
Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(applying Subsection (1Kb) of this section prior
to 1990 amendment regarding impact of guidelines on existing support orders).
The trial court committed reversible error
when it failed to apply the presumptive guidelines set forth in this chapter and determined
child support outside the guidelines without
finding there were special circumstances that
justified deviation. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722
(Utah Ct App. 1992).
— Change in circumstances.
Factors other than a change in relative in-

come affecting the child support calculation can
constitute a material change in circumstances
allowing the court, on a modification petition,
to reach the issue of whether a deviation from
the guidelines is now appropriate. Significant
changes in the factual circumstances of the
child, such as special education or health needs,
which, if in existence at the time of the original
decree, would have permitted an upward deviation from the guidelines in a modification proceeding. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 R2d 955 (Utah
Ct App. 1994).
In cases where the parties' monthly combined
adjusted gross income exceeds the n i c e s t level
specified in the statutory table, the court must
decide whether there has been a substantial
change in the circumstances based on the common law and may find a substantial change of
circumstances warranting a modification of a
child support award based solely on an increase
in the obligor's income, which thereby enables
him to provide greater support. Ball v.
Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Other children.
This section does not mandate that the trial
court give credit for children living in the obligee's current home; rather, the trial court has
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the ability to determine whether or not other
children will be considered in determining the

78-45-7.4

amount of support. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d
1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — From Guesswork to Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev.
Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child 859.

78-45-7.3. Procedure — Documentation — Stipulation.
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving party shall submit:
(a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of child
support requested is consistent with the guidelines.
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not
available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by the
moving party, based on the best evidence available, may be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only be offered after
a copy has been provided to the defaulting party in accordance with Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in an administrative proceeding.
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties shall submit:
(i) a completed child support worksheet;
(ii) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5);
and
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of
child support requested is consistent with the guidelines.
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall be used to review
the adequacy of a child support order negotiated by the parents.
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child support and
alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the stipulated child support
amount or combined amount equals or exceeds the base child support
award required by the guidelines.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.8, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 6; 1990, ch. 100, § 4; 1994,
ch.118,5 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, in Subsection
(SXc), substituted "equals or exceeds the base"

for "exceeds the total" and deleted the former
second sentence which read "When the stipulated amount exceeds the guidelines, it may be
awarded without afindingunder Section 78-457.2."

78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of the
base combined child support obligation. Only income of the natural or adoptive
parents of the child may be used to determine the award under these
guidelines.
History: C. 1963, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, fi 6; 1994, ch. 118, { 6.
Amendment Notes* — The 1994 amend-

ment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "base
combined child support obligation" for "child
support award."
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78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) incomefromsalaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers* compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the
original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than
40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training
Partnership Act, S.S.L, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance;
and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operationfromgross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differfromthe
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly
income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and
complete copies of tax returnsfromat least the most recent year unless the
court finds, the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax
returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derivedfromwork history,
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occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. Tb impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to
establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: (X 1953, 78-45-7^5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994,
ch, 118, § 7; 1996, ch. 171, $ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection
(5Xb).

The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, added "40-hour" and the second sentence
in Subsection (2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
father's small business taxes and his student
loan obligations in calculating his gross income.
Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct App.
1995).

ANALYSIS

Deductible expenses.
Findings by court
Imputed income.
Modification of award.
Second job.
Social Security benefits.
Cited.
Deductible expenses.
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt
with as a matter of law under this section; the
deductibility of particular expenses poses a
question of fact, turning on whether such expenses are necessary, and, if so, whether they
exceed those required for the business's operation at a reasonable level. Bingham v.
Bingham, 872 R2d 1065 (Utah Ct App. 1994).
The trial court acted within its discretion in
not deducting as "necessary expenses required
for self-employment of business operation19 the

Findings by court.
Although a trial court entered findings required by Subsection 7(b), since the trial court
failed to enter any findings required under
Subsection (7Xa), Hie findings on the whole
were insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018
(Utah Ct App. 1993).
Imputed income.
Even though the court's findings of fact did
not include a specific finding that ex-husband
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced
to the imputation of income at the trial level
and because his job history and current employment options inarguably supported this imputation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income in an amount greater
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than the ex-husband's current salary. Hill v.
Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

However, a trial court may not order that those
Social Security benefits be subject to legal process. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).
In a proceeding on a petition by the guardian
and conservator for a child, appointed following
the death of the custodial parent, the trial court
acted within its discretion in refusing to offset
Social Security benefits paid to the child on the
basis of the child's deceased mother's earning
record. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995).
Social Security benefits made to minor children as a result of obligor parent's disability
may be credited toward that parent's ongoing
child support obligation. Coulon v. Coulon, 915
P.2d 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Social Security benefit amounts paid to minor children, which exceed the court-ordered
child support for the same period, may not be
credited toward previously accrued child support arrearages. Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d
1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Modification of award.
When the parties had agreed to the amount
of child support before the effective date of the
child support guidelines, the trial court erred in
modifying child support when no petition to
modify had been filed and in modifying the
support amount without finding that a material
change of circumstances had occurred since the
previous order had been entered. Bailey v.
Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(applying § 78-45-7.2(lXb) prior to 1990
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on
existing support orders).
Second job.
The trial court's decision to consider the
father's second source of income as part of his
primary job was supported by the fact that both
sources involved the performance of his professional duties as a physician. Jensen v. Bowcut,
892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Social Security benefits.
A trial court may, in its discretion, consider a
child's receipt of Social Security benefits
against the parent's child support obligation.

Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Cummings v. Cummings,
821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.LuR, — Attributing undisclosed income to
parent or spouse for purposes of making child
or spousal support award, 70 A.L.R.4th 173.

78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income'' is the amount
calculated by subtracting from gross income alimony previously ordered and
paid and child support previously ordered.
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child support award by adjusting
the gross incomes of the parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceeding. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider that in determining the
child support, the guidelines do not provide a deductionfromgross income for
alimony
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.6, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § &
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — The
Economics of Divorce and Remarriage for Rural
Utah Families, 17 J. Contemp. L. 301 (1990).
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78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations.
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided between them in
proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is
applicable.
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in
Section 78-45-2 and in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is
$1,050 or less monthly, the base child support award shall be determined as
follows:
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child
support obligation table.
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined
child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income.
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is
between $650 and $1,050, the base child support award shall be the lesser of
the amount calculated in accordance with Subsection (2) and the amount
calculated using the low income table.
(4) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined
child support obligations for up to six children. For more than six children,
additional amounts may be added to the base child support obligation shown.
Unless rebutted by Subsection 78-45-7.2(3), the amount ordered shall not be
less than the amount which would be ordered for up to six children.
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is $649 or less, the
court or administrative agency shall determine the amount of the child support
obligation on a case-by-case basis, but the base child support award shall not
be less than $20.
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total
number of children, not an amount per child.
History: C. 1953,78-46-7.7, enacted by L.
1989, ch* 214, § 9; 1990, cb. 100, § 6; 1994,
ch. 118,5 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, added "unless the
low income table is applicable" at the end of
Subsection (1); inserted "and in cases where the
obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less
monthly" and substituted "base" for "total" in
the introductory language of Subsection (2);
inserted "combined" the second time the word
appears in Subsection (2Xa); deleted "and subtracting from the products the children's por-

tion of any monthly payments made directly by
each parent for medical and dental insurance
premiums" at the end of Subsection (2Xb); deleted former Subsections (2Xc) and (2Xd) relating to the calculation of the child support
award; added present Subsections (3) and (5)
and redesignated the subsections accordingly;
in present Subsection (4), substituted "six children» for "ten children" in two places, substituted "may" for "shall" in the second sentence
^ a<jded the third sentence; and made stylis#c changes,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
parent may be credited for insurance premiums
paid by the children's stepparent. Ball v.
Peterson, 912 R2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

ANALYSIS

Applicability
Cited.
Applicability.
This section does not address whether a

ot
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78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases of split custody, the base child support award shall be determined as
follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child
support obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calculated amount
between the parents in proportion to the number of children for whom
each parent has physical custody The amounts so calculated are a
tentative base child support obligation due each parent from the other
parent for support of the child or children for whom each parent has
physical custody
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support obligation due each parent
by the percentage that the other parent's adjusted gross income bears to
the total combined adjusted gross income of both parents.
(3) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection (2)fromthe larger amount
to determine the base child support award to be paid by the parent with
the greater financial obligation.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.8, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 10; 1990, ch. 100, § 7; 1994,
ch. 118, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "base"
for "total" in the introductory language; inserted "combined" the second time the word
appears in the first sentence of Subsection (1);

deleted former Subsection (3) relating to subtraction of payments for medical and dental
insurance premiums; redesignated former Subsection (4) as Subsection (3); deleted former
Subsections (5) and (6) relating to allocation of
combined monthly work related child care costs
and calculation of the total child support
award; and made stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006
(Utah Ct. App. 1996).

78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child support award shall be
determined as follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine
the base combined child support obligation usingtikebase combined child
support obligation table.
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined
child support obligation by multiplying the base combined child support
obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted grosslncome.
The amounts so calculated are a tentative base child support obligation
due from each parent for support of the children.
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child support obligation by the
percentage of time the children spend with the other parent to determine
each parent's tentative obligation to the other parent.
(4) Calculate the base child support award to be paid by the obligor by
subtracting the lesser amount calculated in Subsection (3)fromthe larger
amount.
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(5) The parent determined to be the obligor in Subsection (4) shall pay
the amount calculated in Subsection (4) when the obligee has physical
custody.
History: C. 1958,78-45-7«9, enacted by L.
198$, ch, 214, $ 11; 1980, ch. 100, %ft;1904,
ch. 118, § 10*
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, substituted •base*
for "total* in the introductory language; inserted "combined* the second time the word
appears in Subsection (1); inserted "base* the
second time the word appears in the first sentence of Subsection (2); deleted former Subsection (4) relating to subtraction of payments

made for medical and dental insurance premiUXHB; redesignated former Subsection (&) as
Subsection (4); deleted former Subsection (6)
relating to allocation of the combined work
related child care cost of the parents; redesignated former Subsection (7) as Subsection (5)
and rewrote the provision; deleted former Subsection (8) which read "Include the amounts
determined in Subsections (7Xa) and (b) and
the two total child support awards in the child
support order*; and made stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Ball v. Peterson, 912 R2d 1006
(Utah Ct. App. 1996).

78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18.
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from high school
during the child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs
later, the base child support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower
base combined child support obligation shovm in the table for the remaining
number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child
support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a par child amount derived from the
base child support award originally ordered.
History: C.1968,78-45-7.10, enacted by L.
1889, ch. 214, S 12; 1994, ch. 118, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or has

graduated from high school during the child's
normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later" and deleted "combined* before "child support award" in Subsection (1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
1006 (Utah C t App. 1996).

ANALYSIS

Construction.
Retroactive modification.
Construction*
This section requires that the automatic reduction occur in the base combined child support award, not in the total child support obligatton of one parent. Batt v. Peterson, 912 P.2d

Retroactive modification.
^ 1 9 9 4 ^^oag^ to fl^ section, which
added the alternative later date of reduction in
child support obligation, should not have been
applied to children who reached majority before
the amendment took effect. Ball v. Peterson,
912 P.2d 1W6 (Utah Ct. App. 1996>.

78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation.
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award
be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during which the child is with
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a
recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the
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parties for reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be
approved by the administrative agency. However, normal visitation and
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of
the-consecutive day requirement.
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the
number of children included in the award.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.11, enacted by L. of any 30 consecutive days" at the end of the
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, fi 9; 1994, first sentence and substituted the second and
ch. 118, 5 12.
third sentences for "Only the base child support
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- award is affected by the 50% abatement. The
ment, effective July 1, 1994, in Subsection (1), amount to be paid for work related child care
substituted the language beginning "which the costs may be suspended if the costs are not
child is* for "which the order grants specific incurred during the extended visitation."
extended visitation for that child for at least 25

78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables.
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in
the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be ordered on a
case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the highest
level specified in the table for the number of children due support.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.12, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 14; 1994, ch. 118, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

ment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "shall"
for "may* and inserted "on a case-by-case basis."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Fact-finding.
Fact-finding,
In cases where the parties' income exceeds
the highest monthly combined adjusted gross
income listed on the statutory table, linear

table alone is not enough; strict reliance on
linear extrapolation would be erroneous, bec a u g e t a k e n to ^
e x t r e m e > a c h i l d could be
awarded support vastly exceeding any reasonable need. Ball v. Peterson, 912 R2d 1006 (Utah
Ck App. 1996).
_.. , . _, .
-, ,
m^u
occ 0 0 , K>in
Cited in Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah

78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and functions — Per diem and expenses.
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, the governor shall appoint an advisory
committee consisting of:
(a) two representatives recommended by the Office of Recovery Services;
(b) two representatives recommended by the Judicial Council;
(c) two representatives recommended by the Utah State Bar Association; and
(d) an uneven number of additional persons, not to exceed five, who
represent diverse interests related to child support issues,fitsthe governor
may consider appropriate. However, none of the individuals appointed
under this subsection may be members of the Utah State Bar Association.
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(2) (a) Except as required by Subsection (b), as terms of current committee
members expire, the governor shall appoint each new member or reappointed member to a four-year term.
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (a), the governor
shall, at the time of appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of
terms to ensure that the terms of committee members are staggered so
that approximately half of the committee is appointed every two years.
(3) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired term.
(4) (a) The advisory committee shall review the child support guidelines to
ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate child
support award amounts.
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interim
Committee on or before October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before
October 1 of every fourth year subsequently.
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the majority of the committee, as well as specific recommendations of individual
members of the committee.
(5) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees shall receive no
compensation or benefits for their services, but may receive per diem
and expenses incurred in the performance of the member's official
duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance under
Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their
service,
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members who do not
receive salary, per diem, or expenses from their agency for their
service may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties from the committee at the rates established by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and
63A-3-107.
(ii) State government officer and employee members may decline to
receive per diem and expenses for their service.
(6) Staff for the committee shall be providedfromthe existing budgets of the
Department of Human Services and the Judicial Council.
(7) The committee ceases to exist no later than the date the subsequent
committee under this section is appointed.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.13, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, J 15; 1990, ch, 183, § 58; 1994,
eh. 118,$ 14; 1996, ch. 243, $ 195.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted
-March 1, 1995" for "May 1, 1989 and May 1,
1991" and deleted "then on or before May 1 oF
before "every fourth year" in the introductory
language of Subsection (1).

The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, deleted "and every fourth year subsequently" after "March 1,1995" in the introductory language of Subsection (1); added Subsections (2) and (3); deleted former Subsection (3)
which read: "The committee
members serve
without compensation0; added Subsection (5),
and made appropriate redesignations of subsections.
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78-45-7.14. Base combined child support obligation table
and low income table.
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Monthly Adj.
Gross Income
Prom

lb

701
726
761
776
801
826
851
876
901
926
951
976
1,001

- 725
- 750
- 775
- 800
- 825
- 850
- 875
- 900
- 925
- 950
- 975
- 1,000
- 1,050

1

2

68
90
113

68
91
114
137
159
182
205
228
250

Number of Children
3
4
69
92
115
138
161
184
207
230
253
276
299

History: C. 1953,78-45-7.14, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 118, § 15.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1994, ch. 118, § 15 repeals former § 78-45-

70
93
116
140
163
186
209
233
256
279
302
326
372
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5

6

71
94
118
141
165
188
212
235
259
282
306
329
376

71
95
119
143
166
190
214
238
261
285
309
333
380

7.14, as last amended by Laws 1990, cbi. 100,
§ 10, containing the "Base Combined Child
Support Obligation Table," and enacts the
present section, effective July 1, 1994.

78-45-7.15. Medical expenses.
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the
minor children be provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost.
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for
medical expenses, the court or administrative agency may consider the:
(a) reasonableness of the cost;
(b) availability of a group insurance policy;
(c) coverage of the policy, and
(d) preference of the custodial parent
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket
costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of
insurance.
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the
premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered
under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the
instant case.
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments,
incurred for the dependent children.
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial
enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of
each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section
711
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601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30
calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known of the change.
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days
of payment.
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent
fails to comply with Subsections (6) and (7).
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.15, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 118, § 16; 1995, ch. 258, $ 14,
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1994, ch. 118, § 16 repeals former § 78-457.15, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. 100,
§ 11, relating to medical expenses, and enacts

the present section, effective July 1,1994.
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, deleted "and actually paid by the parents" after "children" at the
e nd of Subsection (5).

78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred.
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent share equally the
reasonable work-related child care expenses of the parents.
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin
paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of
proof of the child care expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be
incurred, that parent may suspend making monthly payment of that
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of
the child support order.
(b) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a parent who
incurs child care expense shall provide written verification of the cost
and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial
engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other
parent.
(ii) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, the parent shall
notify the other parent of any change of child care provider or the
monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of
the change.
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent
incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent
incurring the expenses fails to comply with Subsection (2Kb).
History: C. 1968,78-45-7.16, enacted by L. dent children of the parents shall be specified
1989,ch.214,$ 18; 1990, ch. 100, { 12; 1994, as a separate monthly amount in the order.
"(2) If an actual expense included in an
oh. 118,5 17.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- amount specified in the order ceases to be
ment, efifective July 1, 1994, rewrote this sec- incurred, the obligor may suspend making
tion which read "(1) The monthly amount to be monthly payment of that expense while it is not
paid for reasonable work related child care being incurred, without obtaining a modificacosts actually incurred on behalf of the depen- tion of the child support order."
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78-45-7.17, Child care costs.
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child support order is
presumed, if the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent, during extended
visitation, is working and actually incurring the child care costs.
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be awarded
on a case-by-case basis, if the costs are related to the career or occupational
training of the custodial parent, or if otherwise ordered by the court in the
interest of justice.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.17, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 19; 1994, ch. 118, § 18Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or the
noncustodial parent, during extended visita-

tion" in Subsection (1); added "or if otherwise
ordered by the court in the interest ofjustice* at
the end of Subsection (2); and made stylistic
changes,

78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of support ordered.
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child support award that may be
ordered using the base combined child support obligation table, using the low
income table, or awarding medical expenses except under Subsection (2).
(2) If amounts under either table as provided in Section 78-45-7.14 in
combination with the award of medical expenses exceeds 50% of the obligor's
adjusted gross income, or by adding the child care costs, total child support
would exceed 50% of the obligor's adjusted gross income, the presumption
under Section 78-45-7.17 is rebutted.
History: C. 1953,78-46-7.18, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 20; 1990, ch. 100, § 13; 1994,
ch. 118, § 19.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "using
the low income table, or awarding* for "or for
the award of uninsured" in Subsection (1); sub-

stituted I f amounts under either table as provided in Section 78-45-7.14 in combination with
the award of medical expenses* for I f the
combination of the two amounts under Subsection (1)" at the beginning of Subsection (2); and
made stylistic changes,

78-45-7.19. Determination of parental liability.
(1) The district court or administrative agency may issue an order determining the amount of a parent's liability for medical expenses of a dependent
child when the parent:
(a) is required by a prior court or administrative order to:
(i) share those expenses with the other parent of the dependent
child; or
(ii) obtain insurance for medical expenses but fails to do so; or
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer under insurance coverage
obtained after the prior court or administrative order was issued.
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does not specify what proportions of the expenses are to be shared, the district court may determine the
amount of liability as may be reasonable and necessary.
(3) This section applies to an order without regard to when it was issued.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.19, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 166, § 4; 1994, ch. 118, § 20.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or administrative agency" and substituted "medical
expenses'* for "uninsured medical, hospital, and
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dental expenses" in the introductory language
of Subsection (1); substituted "insurance for
medical expenses'* for "medical, hospital, or

dental care insurance" in Subsection dXaXii);
and made a stylistic change,

78-45-7.20. Accountability of support provided to benefit
child — Accounting.
(1) The court or administrative agency which issues the initial or modified
order for child support may, upon the petition of the obligor, order prospectively
the obligee to furnish an accounting of amoimts provided for the child's benefit
to the obligor, including an accounting or receipts.
(2) The court or administrative agency may prescribe the frequency and the
form of the accounting which shall include receipts and an accounting.
(3) The obligor may petition for the accounting only if current on all child
support that has been ordered.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.20, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 118, S 21.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 118, § 23
makes the act effective on July 1,1994.

78-45-7.2L Award of tax exemption for dependent children.
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to
claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax
purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or
administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a
case-by-case basis.
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall
consider:
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the
cost of raising the child; and
03) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not
current in his child support obligation, in which case the court or administrative agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent.
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will
result in a tax benefit to that parent.
History:C.1953,78-45^7^1,enactedbyL.
1994, ch. 118, i 22.

Effective Dates. - L a w s 1994, ch. 118, § 23
makes the act effective on July 1,1994.

78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction*
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support
where justice requires.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, { 8.
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction
of district court, § 78-3-4.
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78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support.
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor. The
office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable statute
on behalf of:
(i) the Department of Human Services;
(ii) any other department or agency of this state that provides
public assistance, as defined by Subsection 62A-ll-303(3), to enforce
the right to recover public assistance; or
(iii) the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right of support against the
obligor.
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office to enforce
payment of the obligor's support obligation, the attorney general or the
county attorney of the county of residence of the obligee shall represent the
office.
(2) (a) A person may not commence an action, file a pleading, or submit a
written stipulation to the court, without complying with Subsection (2Kb),
if the purpose or effect of the action, pleading, or stipulation is to:
(i) establish paternity;
(ii) establish or modify a support obligation;
(iii) change the court-ordered manner of payment of support; or
(iv) recover support due or owing.
(b) (i) When taking an action described in Subsection (2)(a), a person
must file an affidavit with the court at the time the action is
commenced, the pleading is filed, or the stipulation is submitted
stating whether child support services have been or are being provided under Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 601
et seq., on behalf of a child who is a subject of the action, pleading, or
stipulation.
(ii) If child support services have been or are being provided, under
Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 601 et seq., the
person shall mail a copy of the affidavit and a copy of the pleading or
stipulation to the Office of the Attorney General, Child Support
Division.
(iii) If notice is not given in accordance with this subsection, the
office is not bound by any decision, judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered in the action.
(c) If IV-D services have been or are being provided, that person shall
join the office as a party to the action, or mail or deliver a written request
to the Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division asking the
office to join as a party to the action. A copy of that request, along with
proof of service, shall be filed with the court. The office shall be represented as provided in Subsection (1Kb).
(3) Neither the attorney general nor the county attorney represents or has
an attorney-client relationship with the obligee or the obligor in carrying out
the duties under this chapter.
History: L. 1057, ch. 110,5 9; 1975, ch. 96,
i 23; 1977, ch. 145, § 11; 1982, ch. 63, $ 2;
1989, ch. 62, 5 23; 1990, ch. 183, fi 69; 1994,
ch. 140,5 16; 1995, ch. 258, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsec-

tion (2Xa) which read "A person may not commence any action or file a pleading to establish
or modify a support obligation or to recover
support due or owing, whether under this chapter or any other applicable statute, without
filing an affidavit with the court at the time the
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action is commenced or the pleading is filed
stating whether public assistance has been or is
being provided on behalf of a dependent child of
the person commencing the action or filing the
pleading*; added the designation for Subsection
(2Kb) and the second sentence in the subsection; redesignated former Subsection (2Kb) as
Subsection (2Xc) and added the language beginning "or mail or deliver" at the end of the
first sentence and inserted the second sentence
therein; deleted former Subsection (3) which
read "As used in this section 'office* means the
Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services"; and added Subsection (3).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995,
substituted "child support services have been
or are being provided under Part IV of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 601 et

seq." for "public assistance has been or is being
provided" in Subsection (2XbXi) and (2XbXii);
added "of the Attorney General, Child Support
Division" at the end of Subsection (2XbXii) and
in Subsection (2Xc); added Subsection
(2XbXiii); substituted "IV-D services have been
or are" for "public assistance has been or is" in
Subsection (2Xc); and made numerous stylistic
changes.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of support provisions by Department of Human Services, § 62A-1-111.
General duties of attorney general, § 67-5-1.
General duties of county attorney, § 17-18-1.
Office of Recovery Services responsible to
carry out obligations of Department of Human
Services to collect child support, § 62A-11-104.
Public support of children, § 62A-11-301 et
seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
specialized care throughout their lives, divorced father was ordered to continue support
payments indefinitely, irrespective of the children's chronological age. Dehm v. Dehm, 545
P.2d 525 (Utah 1976).

ANALYSIS

Discharge of debts.
— Bankruptcy
Enforcement by one other than obligee.
— Mother.
Divorce.
Estoppel.
— Parents' actions and agreements.
—Provision of support by other parties.
Intervention by state.
— Divorce.
— Public assistance.
Taking of deposition.
Reimbursement of department.
—Divorce.
Alimony payments.
Child support

Estoppel.
—Parents 9 actions a n d agreements.
A decree awarding child support payments
for a child cannot be avoided by the conduct or
agreement of the parents. French v. Johnson,
16 Utah 2d 360, 401 P.2d 315 (1965).

Discharge of debts.
—Bankruptcy.
Support debts owing to Department of Social
Services are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
State v. Bodily, 652 P.2d 644 (Utah 1976).
Enforcement by one other than obligee.
—Mother.
— —Divorce.
This act does not provide the exclusive remedy to procure support for minor children; this
section is permissive, not mandatory, and does
not foreclose the right of one other than obligee
to enforce the duty of support by any other
means provided by law. Mother could enforce
children's support rights on countermotion for
modification of divorce decree; this section did
not make support rights enforceable by children alone, after their attainment of majority;
since children were retarded and would require

—Provision of s u p p o r t by o t h e r parties.
Children have a right to support, but where
their mother and her second husband had provided it, mother was estopped to demand that
her first husband also contribute support; since
her demand was not in the nature of a claim for
reimbursement, to grant it would have been in
effect to give the children "double support" to
which they were not entitled. Wasescha v.
Wasescha, 548 R2d 895 (Utah 1976).
Intervention by state.
—Divorce.
'While state could properly intervene in divorce proceeding to secure reimbursement from
father of public moneys expended for support of
child, it was not entitled to intervene to secure
reimbursement of funds expended for support
of mother, the wife's right to alimony or support
was dependent upon facts to be brought out in
the course of the divorce proceeding and was
not established until a judgment issued
therein, so prior to that time the state's right to
reimbursement was merely conjectural. Reeves
v. Reeves, 556 P.2d 1267 (Utah 1976).
—Public assistance*
Where divorced wife and her four children
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were living on public assistance, it was proper
for Department of Social Services to intervene
on her behalf in an action by her to force her
ex-husband to make 32 monthly child support
-payments which he then owed. Bartholomew v.
Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah 1976).
Taking of deposition.
Intervention by state pursuant to this section
and § 62A-11-301 et seq. in action by ex-wife,
who was welfare recipient, to compel ex-husband to make delinquent child support payments, while proper, was not sufficient to entitle the state to take the ex-husband's
deposition without first either commencing a
new action or obtaining an order to show cause.
Mattingly v. Mattingly, 562 P.2d 1254 (Utah
1977).
Reimbursement of department.
— Divorce.
Alimony payments.
The Department of Social Service's right to
reimbursement from ex-husband for welfare
payments made to his ex-wife subsequent to
the divorce is limited to his duty of support as
set out in the divorce decree. Mecham v.
Mecham, 570 R2d 123 (Utah 1977).
Department of Social Services was not entitled to reimbursement from ex-husband,
based upon ex-husband's duty of support of his
wife as set out in the divorce decree, for necessities furnished the ex-wife subsequent to the
divorce, where the parties by contract had
modified the ex-husband's duty of support as
set out in the decree, and the husband had
satisfied his duty as modified. Gulley v. Gulley,
570 R2d 127 (Utah 1977).
Child support.
Father had a continuing and inalienable duty
founded in natural law to support his children,

78-45-9.1

and a necessary concomitant of this duty was
an obligation to reimburse one who paid for
such support to rescue children he left in need;
therefore, the Division (now Department) of
Family Services was not required to obtain a
court order establishing defendant father's obligation to pay a specific monthly sum before it
could bring suit under this section for reimbursement State Div. of Family Servs. v. Clark,
554 P.2d 1310 (Utah 1976).
Department of Social Services was entitled to
reimbursement from father of children, based
upon the father's duty of support as set out in a
divorce decree, for necessities furnished the
children, despite father's contract with the children's mother releasing him from support payments in exchange for payment of lump-sum
cash to the mother, since a father has a statutory duty to support his children which may not
be contracted away. Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d
127 (Utah 1977).
State Department of Social Services, which
was joined as a party to the divorce action
before court entered order determining husband's obligation for child support, was entitled
to reimbursement from the husband for assistance furnished the child before entry of the
support order in the amount as fixed in the
support order. Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597
(Utah 1979).
Where Department of Social Services did not
participate in the divorce proceeding because it
was not notified of such proceeding, and the
divorce decree made no mention of temporary
alimony or child support or arrearages of either, the divorce decree was not res judicata as
to father's liability for arrearages of child support and did not bar the department's right to
reimbursement from the father for child support provided to the mother during the pendency of the divorce. Knudson v. Utah State
Dept of Social Servs., 660 R2d 258 (Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion and
Nonsupport §§ 25, 82.
C . J . S . - 4 1 C J . S . Husband and Wife §§ 48
et seq., 241; 67ACJ.S. Parent and Child §§ 73
to 89.
AXJL — Validity and construction of provision for arbitration of disputes as to alimony or
support payments, or child visitation or custody

matters, 18 AJLR.3d 1264.
Power of divorce court, after child attained
majority, to enforce by contempt proceedings
payment of arrears of child support, 32
AXJL8d888.
Key Numbers* — Husband and Wife «=> 4;
Parent and Child «=* 3.3(3).

78-45-9.1. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 78-45-9.1 (L. 1982, ch.
63, § 3), relating to court's order for assignment, support lien, or garnishment of obligor's

income and covering responsibilities of the employer, was repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 14, § 3,
effective July 1,1984.
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78-45-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee.
The county attorney's office shall provide assistance to an obligee desiring to
proceed under this act in the following manner:
(1) provide forms, approved by the Judicial Council of Utah, for an order
of wage assignment if the obligee is not represented by legal counsel;
(2) the county attorney's office may charge a fee not to exceed $25 for
providing assistance to an obligee under Subsection (1).
(3) inform the obligee of the right to file impecuniously if the obligee is
unable to bear the expenses of the action and assist the obligee with such
filing;
(4) advise the obligee of the available methods for service of process;
and
(5) assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a hearing before the
court.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-9.2, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 119, 5 1.
Meaning of "this act." - The term "this
act," in the introductory language, means Laws
1983, ch. 119, which enacted this section.

Cross-References. — Creation of Judicial
Council, Utah Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 12; § 783-21.
General duties of county attorney, § 17-18-1.
Service of process, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.R

78-45-10. Appeals.
Appeals may be takenfromorders and judgments under this act as in other
civil actions.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 10.
Meaning of "this act* — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1.

Cross-References. — Appeals generally,
Rules 3 to 13, U.RA.P.

78-45-11. Husband and wife privileged communication
inapplicable — Competency of spouses.
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of communications between husband and wife are inapplicable under this act. Spouses are competent witnesses to testify to any relevant matter, including marriage and
parentage.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, $ 11.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 78-46-1.
Cross-References. — Marital privilege in

civil actions generally, § 78-24-8; Rule 602,
U.R.E.
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, marital privilege inapplicable to, § 77-81-22.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 81 Am, Jur. 2d Witnesses
§ 296 et seq.

CJJS. - 97 CJ.S. Witnesses § 266 et seq.
Key Numbers. — Witnesses «=» 187 et seq.

78-45-12. Rights are in addition to those presently existing.
The rights herein created are in addition to and not in substitution to any
other rights,
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History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 12.

78-45-13. Interpretation and construction.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
History: L.1957, ch, 110, § 14.
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
same catchline following § 78-46-1.

Cross-References. — Construction of statutes, Title 68, Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Section
78-45a-l.
78-45a-2.
78-45a-3.
78-45a-4.
78-45a-5.
78-45a-6.
78-45a-6.5.
78-45a-7.
78-45a-8.

Obligations of the father.
Determination of paternity —
Effect — Enforcement.
Limitation on recovery from the
father.
Limitations on recoveryfromfather's estate.
Remedies.
Time of trial.
Paternity action — Jury trial.
Authority for genetic testing.
Selection of experts.

Section
78-45a-9.
78-45a-10.
78-45a-10.5.
78-45a-ll.
78-45a-12.
78-45a-13
78-45a-14
78-45a-15.
78-45a-16.
78-45a-17.

Compensation of expert witnesses.
Effect of genetic test results.
Visitation rights of father.
Judgment.
Security.
Settlement agreements.
Venue.
Uniformity of interpretation.
Short title.
Operation of act.

78-45a-l. Obligations of the father.
The father of a child that is or may be born outside of marriage is liable to
the same extent as the father of a child born within marriage, whether or not
the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy
and confinement and for the education, necessary support, and any funeral
expenses for the child. For purposes of child support collection, a child born
outside of marriage includes a child born to a married woman by a man other
than her husband if that paternity has been established.
History: L. 1965, ch. 168, § 1; 1990, ch.
Cross-References. — Public support of chil245, S 22.
dren, § 62A-11-301 et seq.
Uniform Laws. — Other jurisdictions
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, § 78adopting the Uniform Act on Paternity are 45-1 et seq.
Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
and Rhode Island.
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action for reimbursement.
— Collateral estoppel.
— Costs.
Action to establish paternity.
—Attorney fees.
— Statute of limitations.
lulling.

Cause of action for support.
Custody rights.
—Acknowledgment of paternity.
Right to trial by jury.
Action for reimbursement.
— Collateral estoppel.
Where, in a paternity action brought for
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